Cárdenas, J.C. 2003. Rethinking Local Commons Dilemmas: Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field. A shorter version of this paper was published in Isham, J., T. Kelly and S. Ramaswamy (Eds). Social Capital, Economic Development and the Environment, Edward Elgar Publishing. 2002. Northampton. Related papers in English and SpanishA rather recent development in economics is the formal study of how human groups device ways of governing the coordination of actions that produce externalities without the need of a Leviathan with perfect information and costless ways of enforcing rules, or without the need to individualize the property rights over the resource to allow the invisible hand to coordinate choices and results. Social Capital is one of the terms proposed by leading authors like Putnam (1993) to explain those mechanisms (e.g. norms or rules) that groups use to govern themselves. Self-Governance Institutions has been an alternative notion proposed by others like Ostrom (1990). Or a synonymous, Community Governance (Bowles, 1999) which also conveys the same notion. In general, economic analysis is now recognizing that individuals may put in place selfgoverned material and non-material incentives, which induce changes in behavior from self-oriented actions to group-oriented ones, which may produce social outcomes that are superior than those resulting from the purely selfish and short-sighted behavior of individuals. Usually these institutional arrangements achieve the result of correcting the failures of externalities without the intervention of an external agent or the rearrangement of property rights. In particular, the academic debate over the best prediction about the behavior of people that use a Common-Pool Resource (CPR), and the recommended policy approaches to the CPR dilemma have undergone a very interesting evolution throughout the last 3 decades of the past century, since the emergence of at least two seminal contributions; Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) and his reflections on the lack of individual property rights over resources under joint access; and Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965) on the difficulties for large and homogenous groups to achieve the voluntary provision of a public good. The empirical evidence on groups using common-pool resources, dating back for centuries, and still today remaining inconclusive, supports in many cases and rejects in many others the different hypotheses available today. Why in some cases groups succeed collectively in managing a resource for which they have joint access, while in similar situations other groups drive the resource closer to exhaustion and socially undesirable results? Why some individuals do act in these situations according to the theoretical prediction of the homo-economicus while others do not? Further, why do the same individuals do confirm the self-regarding maximizing behavior in competitive market institutions while showing other-regarding preferences under situations that generate outcomes that affect negatively others? The fact that these questions remain unsolved should challenge the way the problem of commons dilemmas is taught and studied in the economics profession, and in how it transpires to policy making debates. However, much of the teaching of this particular problem is done without much of the new theoretical, empirical and experimental contributions that have emerged since Hardin’s tragedy prediction. Today the problem of the commons is still presented to students as a free-rider problem where the individual rationality of those extracting the resource and the lack of private or state ownership of the resource would drive the common-pool to yields that are socially sub-optimal, and eventually to exhaustion. At best, some authors seem to acknowledge the difference in rights and rules between open access and common property. Nevertheless, the introductory level teaching ignores in most cases the possibility of groups devising endogenously institutions for self-management and control, or the possibility of human preferences that involve the welfare or actions of others inducing people to act more cooperative. Further, much of the policy textbook recipes still remain within the two orthodox approaches of assigning individual property rights to the resource (market approach), or transferring all property and control to the government for (state approach) a socially efficient management to emerge. However, a long and rich path has been covered by many social and natural scientists that explore the factors that drive human behavior when facing a CPR dilemma. This paper wants to respond to this concern in two ways. One, by providing in sections 2 and 3 elements from recent advances in the analysis of CPRs that could be easily introduced into the teaching and policy design regarding the social dilemmas arising from the use of commons. In particular, it will highlight the lack of importance given to community governance solutions and the focusing on the state and the market solutions, at least in the teaching and policy design arenas. The second contribution to the concerns mentioned is a set of results (Section 4) from field economic experiments conducted in actual CPR settings in rural locations; the results provide empirical evidence of some of the new developments in the literature, questioning much of the conventional views about these dilemmas and human behavior. Further, the methodological approach of applying experimental economics in the field and in the classroom might bring to the economics profession some lessons and challenges about participatory research and teaching techniques where the participants (villagers or students) become active part of the analysis and not mere subjects that produce data, as usually seen in the conventional literature, teaching and research.

Pound, B., S. Snapp, C. McDougall and A. Braun (Eds). 2003. Managing Natural Resources for Sustainable Livelihoods: Uniting Science and Participation. Earthscan/IDRC.Management of local resources has a greater chance of a sustainable outcome when there is partnership between local people and external agencies, and agendas relevant to their aspirations and circumstances. Managing Natural Resources for Sustainable Livelihoods analyses and extends this premise to show unequivocally that the process of research for improving natural resource management must incorporate participatory and user-focused approaches, leading to development based on the needs and knowledge of local resource users.Drawing on extensive and highly relevant case studies, this book presents innovative approaches for establishing and sustaining participation and collective decision-making, good practice for research, and challenges for future developments. It covers a wide range of natural resources – including forests and soils, and water and management units such as watersheds and common property areas and provides practical lessons from analysis and meta-analysis of cases from Asia, Africa and Latin America. It offers insights on how to make research participatory while maintaining rigour and high-quality biological science, different forms of participation, and ways to scale up and extend participatory approaches and successful initiatives.This book will be invaluable for those professionally involved in natural resource management for sustainable development, and an essential resource for teachers and students of both the biophysical and social science aspects of natural resource management.

Candelo, C. Cárdenas, J.C, JE. Correa, M.C. López, D.L. Maya y M. X. Zorrilla and A.M.Roldan. 2002. Juegos económicos y diagnostico rural participativo. Un manual con ejemplos de aplicación para la cooperación. Universidad Javeriana y WWF Colombia.

Meinzen-Dick, R., L R. Brown, H. Feldstein, and A. Quisumbing. 1997. Gender, Property Rights, And Natural Resources. Food Consumption and Nutrition Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute. Discussion Paper No. 29.This paper analyzes the ways in which gender issues affect property rights and the use of natural resources in developing countries. It examines the informal practices of resource use, usually involving multiple uses by multiple users. Traditional systems of access to land, water, and trees reflect complex dynamics among community members that must be understood in order to design successful policy interventions concerning natural resources. Drawing on examples from developing countries worldwide, the paper identifies broad patterns in how property rights are determined. It discusses the effects of privatization and commoditization of resources, and it identifies key issues to consider in the context of proposed resource management programs.

Beaulieu, N., G. Leclerc, M. Alvarez, G. De Wispeleare, J. Jaramillo, Y. Rubiano, A. Fajardo, O. Muñoz, N. Peñuela. 2001. A Proposed Framework for Using Remote Sensing Imagery to monitor environmental dynamics in support to local planning efforts. Presented at the Workshop on Integrated Natural Resources Management (INRM), 28-31 August, 2001, CIAT, Cali, Colombia.

C√°rdenas, J.C., J.K. Stranlund and C.E. Willis. 2000. Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-out. World Development. 28 (10): 1719-1733. Access from the author's websiteRegulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Therefore, in a situation in which private and social interests diverge, it should be possible to bring about a welfare improvement by imposing rules that provide the necessary incentives for more socially efficient choices. However, experimental evidence shows that individuals do not typically behave as if they are purely self-interested; they tend to make choices that strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in several villages in Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This surprising result occurred because individuals confronted with an external regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and, instead, made choices that were more consistent with pure self interests; that is, the regulation itself appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. The implication is that a policy design aimed simply at establishing incentives that move purely self-interested individuals toward more efficient choices will not necessarily improve social efficiency if the institution itself lessens civic-mindedness and encourages more selfish behavior.

Nefzaoui, A. Y. Saadani, H. Jallouli, N. Raggad, A. Jemai avec Grigory Lazarev. 2003. Guide Operationnel Pour L’elaboration Et La Mise En Œuvre De Plan De Developpement Participatif Avec Les Communautes Agro-Pastotrales. Equipe d’appui Mashreq/Maghreb. Projet De Developpement Agropastoral Et De Promotion Des Initiatives Locales Dans Le Sud Est (PRODESUD). INRAT/FIDA/ICARDA.Le guide opérationnel rappelle et indique la logique des différentes étapes à franchir pour atteindre les objectifs de la planification locale concertée. Il laisse à l’équipe opérationnelle une marge de manœuvre et d’adaptation au contexte spécifique de chacune des communautés impliquées. Sur la base d’un test méthodologique, conduit par une équipe de conseillers en méthodologie en étroite concertation avec l’équipe du projet, la communauté, le personnel du Commissariat régional au développement agricole (CRDA) et d’autres partenaires, une première version a été élaborée et a servi de support de formation de l’équipe du projet composé des facilitateurs/animateurs, des spécialistes matières ainsi que du personnel du CRDA. La version finale du guide a été ensuite élaborée en tenant compte des différents commentaires ainsi que du premier travail engagé par l’équipe du projet dans une nouvelle Unité socio-territoriale (UST), avec l’appui des conseillers en méthodologie. La structure du guide et sa présentation suivent pratiquement les différentes séquences méthodologiques telles qu’elles ont été réellement vécues au moment de leur exécution. Cette référence devrait aider l’équipe du projet à retrouver facilement l’expérience q’elle a vécu lors de la formation sur le terrain.